The stable marriage problem is a matching problem that pairs members of two sets. The objective is to achieve a matching that satises all participants based on their preferences. The stable roommate problem is a variant involving only one set, which is partitioned into pairs with a similar objective. There exist asymptotically optimal algorithms that solve both problems.
Introduction
Consider the problem of assigning 3n students to n disjoint work groups of three students each. The students must guard against any three individuals abandoning their assignments and instead conspiring to form a new group that they consider more desirable.
The following procedure is followed: each student ranks all 1 2 (3n 0 1)(3n 0 2) possible pairs of fellow students according to her preference for working with the pairs. A destabilizing triple for an assignment M consists of three students such that each ranks the remaining two (as a pair) more desirable than the pair that she is assigned to in M. The students' task, the 3-person stable assignment problem (or 3PSA for short), is to nd a stable assignment , one that is free of all destabilizing triples, if such an assignment exists.
Readers will recognize that 3PSA is a three-dimensional generalization of the stable roommate problem , which partitions 2n persons into n pairs of stable roommates. A better known variation is the stable marriage problem , which divides the participants into two disjoint sets, male and female. Each pair in a stable marriage must include a male and a female. The stable marriage problem has a similar generalization in three dimensions, which we name the 3-gender stable marriage problem (or 3GSM for short) and dene in the next section.
The stable roommate and stable marriage problems have been studied extensively [3] [4] [5] [9] .
There exist ecient algorithms for both problems that run in O(n 2 ) time [1] [6] [10] . Ng and Hirschberg have obtained lower bound results proving that these algorithms are asymptotically optimal [12] . Since no signicant improvement is possible on the original problems, it is then natural to consider their three-dimensional generalizations, 3GSM and 3PSA. This is one of twelve research directions suggested by Knuth in his treatise on the stable marriage problem [9] .
In this paper, we show that both 3GSM and 3PSA are NP-complete. Hence, it is unlikely that fast algorithms exist for these problems. The NP-completeness of 3GSM has been independently established by Subramanian [15] . In [11] , we extend the approach developed in this paper to the study of two problems dealing with the task of matching married couples to jobs.
Denitions
An instance of 3GSM involves three nite sets A, B, and D. These sets have equal cardinality k, which is the size of the problem instance. A marriage in 3GSM is a complete matching of the three sets, i.e., a subset of A Although 3GSM is similar to its 2-gender counterpart in that an instance can have more than one stable marriage, 1 it diers from the 2-gender counterpart in that there exist instances that have no stable marriage. 
NP-Completeness of 3GSM
In the previous section, we noted that some instances of 3GSM do not have stable marriages. In this section, we will show that deciding whether a given instance of 3GSM has a stable marriage is an NP-complete problem. This is accomplished 1 In fact, the number of stable marriages in many instances is exponential in the instances' size.
Irving and Leather [7] give a proof of this for the 2-gender case. Extending the proof to cover the 3-gender case is straightforward. by giving a polynomial transformation from the 3-dimensional matching problem (or 3DM for short) to 3GSM. A proof that 3DM is NP-complete is rst given in Karp's [8] . This assumption is made without loss of generality. In their reference work on NP-completeness, Garey Figure 2 . In Figure 2 and subsequent gures, we are only interested in the roles played by a few items in each preference list. Therefore, we use the notation 5 Rem to denote any xed but arbitrary permutation of the remaining items.
1 j 1 1 2 1 1 We shall prove later in Lemma 2 that the triples 1 1 1 and 2 2 2 must be included in any stable marriage. Note that 1 1 1 is the weakest link in such a marriage because it represents the least preferred match for both 1 and 1 .
Consequently, if any element a 2 A is matched in marriage with a pair that it prefers less than 1 1 , then a 1 1 becomes a destabilizing triple.
The above observation gives us a strategy that uses the pair 1 1 as a \boundary" in the preferences of A's remaining elements. A necessary condition for a stable marriage in I is that all remaining elements of A must match with pairs located left of the boundary, i.e., 1 1 . Using information from T 0 to construct the set of items to be positioned left of the boundary, we ensure that this condition for stable marriage can be met only if T 0 contains a complete matching. The remaining diculty is to ensure that matching all elements of A left of the boundary is sucient to yield a stable marriage. Before giving details of the construction that provides the solution, we rst prove the lemmas that establish the frame's properties. Lemma 1: If a stable marriage M exists for I constructed by extending the frame in Figure 2 [2] , and a i [3] in A. These clones' preferences are set up to make it possible for exactly one of their matches in a stable marriage to correspond to a triple in T 0 .
To prevent the two remaining clones from interfering with the above setup, we add elements w ai ,y ai to B and x ai ,z ai to D. In a stable marriage, the pairs w ai x ai and y ai z ai are required to match with two of a i 's clones, putting them out of action. We complete the sets B and D by adding to them the elements of , the preferences in Figure 3 accomplish the objectives outlined above. When there exist fewer than three triples containing a i , we equate two or more of the j's and l's.
The following lemma establishes the roles of w ai , x ai , y ai and z ai . Lemma 3: If a stable marriage M exists for I constructed with the preferences shown in Figure 3 , then for every a i 2 A 0 , there exist j 1 ; j 2 2 f1; 2; 3g, j 1 Consider the triple a i [1] w ai x ai , which represents the third preference choice of x ai and the rst preference choices of a i [1] and w ai . It becomes a destabilizing triple unless x ai is matched with one of its rst three preference choices, proving part (a) of the lemma.
Similarly, z ai must be matched with one of its rst three preference choices. Otherwise, y ai z ai forms a destabilizing triple with a i [1] or a i [2] , depending on which a i clone is matched in part (a).
We To show that M is stable, it is sucient to show that no element of A is a component of a destabilizing triple. 1 and 2 satisfy this condition immediately because they are matched with their rst preference choices.
Referring to Figure 3 , each of the remaining elements of A is matched with a pair located left of the boundary. Hence, the only pairs that can form destabilizing triples are w ai x ai and y ai z ai . However, w ai 's (y ai 's) match is one of its rst three preference choices. These three choices are in exact reverse order of x ai 's (z ai 's). This eliminates w ai and y ai from participating in any destabilizing triple. 3GSM is NP-complete. It is easy to verify that the construction of I from I 0 can be accomplished within a polynomial time bound. Therefore, Theorems 1 and 2 establish that 3GSM is NP-hard. It is also possible to check the stability of a given marriage in polynomial time, establishing 3GSM's membership in NP.
NP-Completeness of 3PSA
The NP-completeness of 3PSA follows from that of 3GSM because the former is a generalization of the latter. Given a 3GSM instance I where A = fa 1 Each element of S retains its entire preference list from I as the rst k 2 preference items inÎ. We refer to these k 2 items as inherited items . All remaining items are inconsequential inÎ and are arranged in xed but arbitrary permutations following the inherited items. The result is illustrated in Figure 4 . 3PSA is NP-complete.
Proof:
Any stable marriage M in I is an assignment inÎ. Any destabilizing triple for M inÎ is simultaneously a destabilizing triple for M in I. Therefore, the stability of M in I implies its stability inÎ.
We claim that any stable assignmentM inÎ involves only inherited items and is therefore a marriage in I. This is equivalent to claiming thatM is a complete SinceM involves only inherited items, any destabilizing triple forM in I is simultaneously a destabilizing triple forM inÎ. Therefore, the stability ofM inÎ implies its stability in I.
Related Results
In addition to the interest generated amongst computer scientists, the stable marriage problem has also received substantial attention from game theorists. It is used to model economic problems that require matching representatives from dierent market forces, such as matching labor to the job market. Since 1951, the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) has based its success on an algorithm that solves the stable marriage problem [14] . NRMP is the centralized national program in the United States that matches medical school graduates to hospital resident positions.
In recent years, NRMP administrators have recognized that an increasing proportion of medical school graduates comes from the set of married couples who are both medical students graduating in the same year. In 1983, NRMP instituted a \couples program" which allows a participating couple to increase the probability of their being matched with two resident positions in close proximity. To participate in this special program, a couple submits a combined preference list that ranks pairs of resident positions.
In 1984, Roth [14, p. 1008] discovered a dilemma with NRMP's couples program. He showed that there are instances where no stable matching can exist. Recently, Ronn [13] proved that the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists in an instance of the couples program is NP-complete.
As an extension of our work in this paper, we have obtained an alternate NPcompleteness proof for NRMP's couples program [11] . We model the couples program as a job matching problem for dual-career couples where only a single job market is involved. Each couple has a preference list that ranks pairs of available positions. However, each employer ranks applicants individually without regard to marriage relations. A matching is stable if no couple can nd an alternate pair of employers such that all four participants benet from the new arrangement.
The NP-completeness proof for the problem in the above model is an adaptation of those developed in this paper. We refer interested readers to [11] for further details. In addition, we also examine the simpler problem that results when the employers are partitioned into two disjoint job markets, one for the male and female participants respectively. We show that the problem remains NP-complete even with this simplication.
Conclusions and Open Problems
We have shown that three-dimensional generalizations of the stable marriage and stable roommate problems are NP-complete. Our result also applies to the problem of nding stable job assignments for dual-career couples, resulting in an alternate NP-completeness proof for NRMP's couples program. It may be interesting, as a topic for further research, to investigate the possibility of applying our result to other matching problems and their variants.
The proofs in this paper exploit the ability to assign a somewhat \inconsistent" preference list. For example, in Figure 2 , 2 does not rank 1 consistently ahead of 2 but instead depends on who the 's are matched with. In the example, 1 1 2 1 2 but 2 2 2 2 1 . An interesting question to consider is whether the matching problems remain NP-complete if all preference lists must obey a \consistency property", namely, xy a xz holds for either all x's or no x.
The are other ways to generalize the stable marriage problem in three dimensions besides those considered in this paper. One of the referees, who called our attention to this problem, attributes its origin to Knuth and dubbed it \circular" 3GSM. The complexity of this problem is currently an open problem.
